Laljee v. Aviva General Insurance Company, 2024 ONSC 2577
Reading Time: 3 minutes (approx.)
By: Alexandre Doucet (Articled Clerk)
This case stems from an appeal of the Licence Appeal Tribunal’s (“LAT”) dismissal of the claimant’s entitlement to benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Accidents on or After November 1, 1996, O. Re. 403/96 (“SABS”).
The Appellant, Dilshad (Dee) Laljee, was involved in a motor vehicle accident on August 27, 2009, when her vehicle collided with another vehicle while she was reversing out of a parking space. The Appellant applied for benefits pursuant to SABS through Aviva, the Respondent, but her claim was denied and she applied to the LAT for resolution.
The original decision was dated on July 31, 2023. A subsequent reconsideration of the decision was dated November 16, 2023 and made by Adjudicator Kate Grieves of the LAT who found that: firstly, the Appellant was not catastrophically impaired as a result of her 2009 accident; secondly, she was not entitled to a treatment plan she suggested; thirdly, a limitation period had expired; and finally, she had not demonstrated certain treatments were reasonable or necessary.
On her application for reconsideration of the LAT’s decision, the Appellant alleged violations of procedural fairness and that the initial decision contained errors of fact. She alleged materials were not disclosed and that other materials were illegible, thereby hindering her capacity as a self-represented Claimant to properly present her case.
Procedural fairness is a type of standard of review. It asks whether errors in the way the hearing was conducted exists or if the decision itself was fair and impartial. It does not consider the correctness of a decision made, but rather the process in which a decision-maker arrived at a decision.
Justices Lococo, Matheson and Mew wrote unanimously that the Appellant’s allegations of procedural unfairness were unfounded. Not only was the Appellant’s statement that materials were not disclosed untrue, the Appellant also did not identify the materials supposedly not disclosed. Furthermore, most of the materials were typed or otherwise legible. Finally, while some of the Appellant’s expert materials might have alluded to a conclusion that supported her impairment, the adjudicator properly considered and weighed the appellant’s pre-existing psychological conditions as having materially contributed to her current condition. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
