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By: Krista Nasartschuk
In March of 2014, Meghan Trainor (the Plaintiff) was travelling as a passenger in her mother’s Dodge Caravan when the vehicle was struck by Sebastien DeArcos’ Chevrolet Silverado. As a result of the collision, the Plaintiff suffered a broken heel bone, a bruised chest, and a hairline fracture in her hand. The Plaintiff was 20 years old at the time and had a number of pre-existing physical and mental health issues. Unfortunately, her condition deteriorated exponentially in the years following the MVA, such that she developed chronic pain, a TMJ disorder due to grinding her teeth, and required additional surgeries due to a pre-existing condition of her right leg.
The court examined the issue of causation and stated that in order to warrant recover, the accident must be the cause of a plaintiff’s injuries (causation in fact) and the injuries must be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the accident (causation in law).
Relying on the precedent set by Nelson (City) v Marchi, 2021 SCC 41, Edmondson et. al. v Edmondson et. al., 2022 NBCA 4, and Clements v Clements, 2012, SCC 32, the court determined that factual causation was established with respect to Ms. Trainor’s injuries.
With respect to causation at law, the court held that the key concepts to be considered were as follows:
- The “real risk” which would occur in the mind of a reasonable individual;
- The objective assessment of a person of ‘ordinary fortitude’; and,
- That unusual or extreme reactions are imaginable, but not reasonably foreseeable.
The court found that the most convincing point with respect to causation at law was that the Plaintiff’s pre-existing psychological conditions, despite being well-managed, put her at a higher risk for experiencing acute pain which would transition to chronic pain. The court concluded that the Plaintiff had experienced an acute reaction to localized pain (in her foot, hand and chest) which caused an unusual and extreme continued impairment (chronic pain, TMJ and additional surgeries).
The court concluded that Ms. Trainor’s chronic pain, TMJ, and leg issues were not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the collision and, therefore, were too remote at law to warrant recovery.
Alternatively, the court wrote that the crumbling skull doctrine precluded recovery for these injuries. While the thin skull doctrine makes a Defendant liable for all injuries, even if those injuries are more severe than expected due to a pre-existing but stable condition, the crumbling skull doctrine pertains to plaintiffs with an unstable pre-existing condition. When applying the crumbling skull doctrine, the defendant need not compensate a plaintiff for the effects of their pre-existing condition. The court found that the Plaintiff’s pre-existing condition was not a latent weakness or susceptibility but rather a pre-existing condition which was triggered and activated by the accident, engaging the crumbling skull doctrine.
